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Where'er my footsteps turned
 Her voice was like a hidden bird that sang;
 The thought of her was like a flash of light
 Or an unseen companionship.—*Wordsworth* [*of his sister*].

Wordsworth and his exquisite sister are with me. Her information various; her eye watchful in minutest observation of Nature; her taste a perfect electrometer.—*Coleridge*.

THE STOIC.

Fearless, regretless, invincible, impassive,
 Unwounded with wounds, and in sickness still whole,
 At large when in prison, more free when a captive,
 The gods cannot break his adamantean soul.

ANTI-STOIC.

Soft, sensitive, wayward, full of hopes and regrets,
 Cast down with a look, only strong with caresses,
 Changeable as water, save when love him besets,
 Wine, the Muses, and women be life-long blesses.

J. ALBEE.

BOOK NOTICES.

SENECA AND KANT; OR, AN EXPOSITION OF STOIC AND RATIONALISTIC ETHICS, WITH A COMPARISON OF THE TWO SYSTEMS. By Rev. W. T. JACKSON, Ph. D., late Professor of Modern Languages in Indiana University, Dayton, Ohio. United Brethren Publishing House, 1881.

This essay is an extension of a thesis originally prepared for the degree of Ph. D. in Michigan University. It contains a short but clear statement of the historical origin of stoicism, and of the ethical doctrines of stoicism, and especially of the stoicism of Seneca, as well as of the ethical system of Kant, and a comparison and criticism of the systems of Seneca and Kant. The most original part of the essay is undoubtedly the presentation of the views of Seneca, as based upon an examination at first hand of that writer's *De Providentia*, *De Tranquillitate Animi*, *De Brevitate Vitæ*, *De Vita Beata*, and *Epistola*. This part of the treatise is worthy of high commendation, although, perhaps, the dialectical movement by which the purely negative side of stoicism developed into the positive doctrine of cosmopolitanism might have been more clearly brought out. The corresponding statement of Kant's ethical system, while it rests upon the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics*, and is very clear so far as it goes, cannot be regarded as adding much to our knowledge of his rather complex and by no means self-consist-

ent theory. The truth is that it is impossible to do justice to Kant without a comprehensive study of his three great *Critiques* of Pure Reason, Practical Reason, and Judgment, and an exhibition of their mutual relations; and it may be doubted if Dr. Jackson has done wisely in severing them from one another. The distinction of *noumena* and *phenomena*, which plays so important a part in the Critical Philosophy, cannot be presented, except in its more superficial aspects, unless a careful distinction is drawn between the thing in itself in the vulgar sense of a mere unknown something lying beyond the boundaries of knowledge, and in the high sense of that which, while beyond sense-experience, is yet within the grasp of reason. That both of these conceptions are implied in Kant's doctrine is beyond question, and the expounder of his ethical theory must perforce enquire how far he consciously distinguished them, and whether the rejection of the former is incompatible with the acceptance in some sense of the latter. In making these reservations I should not wish to be understood as denying the value, to students of Kant's ethical theory, of Dr. Jackson's clear and precise statement of the purely ethical part of it, but only as indicating a region of enquiry which it might be profitable to follow out, and the following out of which would lead to most important results.

The analogy of stoical and Kantian ethics is one that cannot escape the observation of any thoughtful student of both systems. In the "autonomy of reason and the subjection of passion," as Dr. Jackson points out, Kant and the stoics are at one; to which might be added the assertion of the negative and non-sensuous character of what Kant calls "reverence for the moral law." But it soon appears that the points of divergence are even more numerous. It is, perhaps, somewhat beneath the dignity of the subject to insist on distinction in literary style and intellectual capacity—things which are outside of the subject proper. Nor do I think that Seneca's philosophy of nature can quite justly be called "inextricable fatalism," while Kant's distinction of *noumena* and *phenomena* "leaves man a sphere of freedom." Fatalism is not identical with conscious subordination to law, and Kant's *noumenon*, literally interpreted, as indeed Dr. Jackson himself suggests, admits of no freedom but that which consists in willing nothing in particular. The criticisms of Kant's ethics, however, while some of them are not exactly new, and while others have a slight savour of theological dogmatism which should be avoided in a purely philosophical treatise, are on the whole stimulating and suggestive.

JOHN WATSON.

THE HIBBERT LECTURES, 1881. On the Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated by some Points in the History of *Indian Buddhism*. By T. W. RHYS DAVIDS. London: Williams & Norgate. Pp. 262.

Mr. Rhys Davids has not fallen behind the lecturers of former years in power to interest and edify. He has the merit of a sympathetic perspicacity, that, not encumbered or deflected by the details and niceties of his scholarship, goes straight to the heart of his subject. And his intuition is not more sure than his expression of it is clear and vivid. These lectures have the distinction and intensity of religious discourse. And it is no disparagement of Mr. Davids' part in this effect on the reader to say that his happy choice of passages from the Buddhist sacred writings in no small degree contributes to it. These Scripture readings almost invariably lead to eloquent comment. Yet, perhaps, the essential note of the book is the judicial comprehensiveness of his comparative view of Buddhism and Christianity. There is in it no special pleading for either one or the other; and out of this impartial consideration of their difference and agreement Mr. Davids brings away much that is instructive, and throws

light on what it is the business of a Hibbert lecturer to elucidate—the origin and growth of Religion in general.

A careful perusal will make it evident that a first principle of his treatment is, that Religion issues from the heart of man, and Revelation comes from within; and, accordingly, that no church can claim the prerogative of a unique and preternatural origin and consequent exemption from a criticism and comparison that ought to be perfectly free amid its reverence for what is in every case so eminently human. That a religion may be *prima inter pares* is enough. In venturing to attribute these latent convictions to Mr. Davids, no wrong will be done him, if Religion in its inwardness is carefully discriminated from its after-growth and shell of creed and ceremony, however natural and inevitable these may be seen to have been as vehicle—like as you must carry precious perfume in a vase. This distinction is another undercurrent that rules his thought throughout. Again, while he claims that a right use of the comparative study of religion leads to the discovery of “general tendencies,” he holds out no present hope of finding “laws” of religious development and decay in any sense that would establish “a science of religion.”

In the first lecture, his just sense of perspective recognizes Buddhism to be comparatively in the foreground of religious development as we ought to picture it; and he gives a rapid but none the less effective sketch of the beliefs and ideas that led up to it through the long dim foretime. When Buddhism arose, universal Animism had, by selection and promotion of fittest “ghosts,” given issue to the polytheism of the Veda, while still itself surviving as manifold superstition in the popular mind and the Atharva-Veda, which may be called the book of the lesser spirits or souls. When Gotama came, he found these ghosts or spirits inside everything. Nothing was inanimate. The “internal spirit” of every one had existed in other bodies or things before, and would do so again. Further, even a single act of carelessness consigned the noblest and purest ghost to a degraded and miserable tenement on his current lease expiring, and so on without hope of end. Such was the doctrine of the Transmigration of Souls, which Mr. Davids thinks must have at times engendered in most men “a vague feeling of helplessness and hopelessness.” There may have been a feeling more than usually strong in Gotama’s time that the Sankhya and Vedānta had broken down; and the saying, that “there is always a metaphysical shipwreck connected with the rise of such great sorrows,” may have a share of truth, and help to account for the conception of Buddhism in the mind of Gotama; just as the post-Kantian Absolutisms, first received with enthusiasm and implicitly trusted, but afterwards found wanting and forsaken, may be fairly taken to have provided in great part the emotional motive of German pessimism. What Buddha did for the world-weary, heavy-laden toilers of life was to effect a change of front for them along the whole line. He swept away the entire soul-theory, from the grossest animism up to Deism, with all its dogmas and rites. This absolutely new departure is the central and signal fact in Buddhism. Yet, unfortunately, he dealt with Animism “as some Broadchurchmen deal with beliefs accepted now.” “He endeavored to bring it into harmony with his new ideas by putting new meanings into the old phrases”—the new wine into the old bottles; and such compromise, Mr. Davids thinks, has been one of the main causes of the practical failure of Buddhism, as well as Stoicism, Christianity, Comtism, and Confucianism, in the sense that they “have so far disappointed the hopes of their founders and of their earliest disciples.” “Each is the natural outcome of an immeasurable past,” and, unable to shake off its inheritance, has naturally preserved many of the old phrases, and so

left a soil for the old weeds to flourish in and choke the Word. Gotama retained the doctrine that whatsoever a man reapeth that hath he sown. Karma took the place of souls. Karma is the aggregate or resultant of an infinite series of lives. It is "persistent force." The same continuous Karma makes identical and continuous the individual links in each chain of lives, and so the sense of injustice excited by the inequalities of life is appeased. The transmission of Karma prefigures "the conservation of energy" from an ethical point of view and with ethical motive. But what determines the same Karma, presently embodied in any given individual, to perpetuate itself in a particular series of individuals? Gotama gives a similar answer to Plato in the *Phædo*. It is the weak, craving thirst for further life in the creature flickering out that brings the Karma to a focus in the birth of a new creature. Otherwise, it would disintegrate and disperse. There is some obscurity about the author's exposition here. But it does not appear that Gotama contemplated the *destruction* of Karma, but only of its extrinsic principle of individuation. The Arhat, or perfect man, having traversed the noble Eightfold Path, has ceased from all base craving from the lust of the flesh, the lust of life, and the pride of life, and from "the inward fires of lust, hatred, and delusion," and has so attained Nirvâna, Rest. The Kingdom of Heaven is *within* him, and the peace that passeth understanding. This peace is no annihilation of a soul that never was, nor extinction of any desire that is not base, nor even, it would appear, of Karma, but only its dispersion, and that *merely by the way*. Nirvâna is its own reward and end, the *summum bonum*; and not to be thought of or aimed at as a means. To obtain Nirvâna, one need not accept the Karma-theory. To aim at it is not hedonistic self-seeking, but at the same time it is not *intentionally* an altruistic endeavor to prevent a new person from falling heir to the accumulated Karma. It never occurred to the early Buddhist teachers any more than to the early Christians to inculcate a duty towards the beings that will exist in the ages to come. It is a "modern conception," though the Nirvâna of the Arhat included a "heart of love, far-reaching, grown great, and beyond measure." "It is only the evil desires, the grasping, selfish aims, which the Arhat has to overcome." This he does by "insight." In the Book of the Great Decease, "Insight" is assigned as important a function as *τὸ φρονεῖν* in the *Philebus*. The wicked man who breaks faith for the sake of worldly advantage is a *fool*, and his hungry eyes glare restlessly under a straitened forehead. Yet "insight" is not the privilege of the learned or shrewd. It rather appertains to the childlike and poor in spirit, and resembles the justifying faith of St. Paul. The first two insights are into "impermanency and non-individuality."

"Transient are all component things!

Growth their nature and decay:

They are produced, they are dissolved again:

And then is best—when they have sunk to rest!"

This refrain, ever-recurring in Buddhist literature, is the Πάντα βεῖ of Heraclitus at once affirmed and resolved. There is no immortal soul, nothing abides, but the Arhat finds in Nirvâna an *intensively* eternal life, stable amid the flux in its indifference to it. He has reached a haven outside of the realm of death.

It has been impossible to do more than touch some salient features of Mr. Davids' portraiture of early Buddhism. In his lecture on the Buddhist Biographies he concludes that "the Cakka-vatti Buddha was to the early Buddhists what the Messiah Logos was to the early Christians." Cakka-vatti was the pre-Buddhist ideal king of Righteousness; Buddha the ideal perfectly wise man, or personification of wisdom.

“And it is the Cakka-vatti Buddha circle of ideas in the one case, just as the Messiah Logos in the other, that has had the principal influence in determining the opinions of the early disciples as to the person of their master.” So “Buddhism may be found as useful for the true appreciation of early Christianity as the Vedas are useful for the true appreciation of classical mythology.”

It is the inculcation of such principles for use in the study of Religion in general that makes this book most valuable; and it will be esteemed by the student as a discipline, even more than as a store of information. J. BURNS-GIBSON, M. A.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

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Platone e l'Immortalità dell' Anima. Per A. Vera, Professore di Filosofia nella Università di Napoli, già Professore di Filosofia nella Università di Francia. Napoli: Detken e Rocholl, Piazza del Plebiscito. 1881.

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On the Modern Science of Economics. A Paper read before the Banker's Institute, March 16, 1881. By Henry Dunning Macleod, Esq., M. A., of Trinity College, Cambridge, and the Inner Temple, Barrister at Law. Reprint from “The Journal of the Institute of Bankers.” Pp. 1-17.

Ueber die Principien der aristotelischen Philosophie und die Bedeutung der Phantasie in derselben. Von J. Frohschammer, Professor der Philosophie in Muenchen. Muenchen, 1881. Adolf Ackermann. Pp. 1-143.

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Der Heliocentrische Standpunct der Weltbetrachtung. Von Dr. Alfons Bilharz. Stuttgart: Verlag der J. G. Cottaschen Buchhandlung. 1879.